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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees freedom of speech.' The phrase "freedom of speech," long
understood to encompass both political and ideological speech, has'
been held to include some forms of entertainment.s Difficulty
arises, however, in defining the parameters of protected expres-
sion.3 Expression entails not only words but can encompass certain
1. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
3. Legal theorists advance different views on what constitutes expression. Absolutists
interpret the First Amendment in its literal sense, while others find room in the First
Amendment for a balancing test. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16.7, at 942-44 (4th ed. 1991). Justices Black and Douglas are known for subscribing
to the absolutist view, which by definition does not allow for a balancing test. Thus, free
speech is an absolute right. Id. Justice Harlan is identified with the view that various forms
of speech may be balanced against regulatory statutes. Id. at 943. Through the passage of
time, the Supreme Court has extended the protections of the First Amendment normally
associated with political speech to some expressive activities including various forms of en-
tertainment. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (musical
production); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (film); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures). Because some forms of entertainment have found
constitutional protection, the question has arisen as to whether nonobscene adult entertain-
1
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conduct as well.4 However, conflict occurs when nonverbal behavior
is perceived as protected expression by some, but mere conduct by
others.5 Recently, this dilemma rose to the forefront as the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of First Amendment protection
for nude dancing as expression in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.6
In Barnes, the issue before the Court was whether the applica-
tion of an Indiana public indecency statute to nude dancing imper-
missibly infringed upon freedom of speech. The statute defined
public indecency,' in part, as "knowingly or intentionally, in a pub-
lic place: . . . appear[ing] in a state of nudity. . . ."' J.R.'s Kitty
Kat Lounge9 and Glen Theatre, Inc.,' 0 in separate actions, sought
to enjoin the state from enforcing the statute against them as both
establishments provided nude dancing as entertainment.1 Both
actions were consolidated on appeal.'2
Initially, the district court granted the injunction, finding the
statute facially overbroad." However, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded,1 4 whereby the district court held that the nude
ment in the form of nude dancing can claim First Amendment protection. See Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 67 (1981) ("[Nlude dancing is not without its First
Amendment protections from official regulation."). See also Lisa Malmer, Comment, Nude
Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1275 (1991).
4. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 825-27 (2d ed.
1988).
5. Id.
6. 59 U.S.L.W. 4745 (U.S. June 21, 1991). In Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), the court held that nude dancing is entitled to limited First
Amendment protection. The majority of the court based its holding on the inherent expres-
sive element of nude dancing. The dissent, however, argued that the regulation was directed
at the conduct of nudity.
7. The Indiana statute provides, in part:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public
indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the fe-
male breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or
the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1985).
8. Id. § 35-45-4-1(a)(3).
9. J.R.'s Kitty Kat Lounge is an establishment which serves alcoholic beverages.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d at 1082.
10. Glen Theatre, Inc. does not serve alcoholic beverages. Id.
1i. Id.
12. Id.
13. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
14. The statute had previously received a limiting construction from the Indiana Su-
[Vol. 9:201
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dancing at issue was not afforded protection under the First
Amendment.'" The court of appeals again reversed and re-
manded,16 but then vacated its own opinion and granted a rehear-
ing en banc.'7 The court of appeals found that nonobscene nude
dancing performed as entertainment is expression entitled to lim-
ited First Amendment protection, and held the Indiana statute un-
constitutional as applied. 8 On certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed: Enforcement of Indiana's public indecency




The Supreme Court addressed the issue of expressive conduct
in the landmark decision of United States v. O'Brien.20 In O'Brien,
an antiwar protestor burned his draft card and was charged with
violating a federal statutori provision which prohibited the inten-
tional destruction of selective service certificates.2' The protestor
argued that the act of destroying his draft card was "symbolic
speech," and, therefore, the provision was unconstitutional as ap-
plied.22 The Court, however, disagreed and upheld the provision
stating that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limit-
less variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. '2 Fur-
ther, the Court established a test to determine whether a regula-
tion is justified despite its incidental restriction on expression.24
Under the O'Brien test, a regulation will be upheld if it meets
preme Court, which saved it from overbreadth. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287
(7th Cir. 1986).
15. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
16. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989).
17. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1990).
18. Id.
19. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4745 (U.S. June 21, 1991).
20. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
21. Id. at 370.
22. Id. at 376.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 376-77. "[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.
The nonspeech aspect of O'Brien's activity was the destruction of his draft card. The speech
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four requirements.2 First, the regulation must be within the con-
stitutional power of the government." Second, the regulation must
further a substantial governmental interest.2 Third, the govern-
mental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion.2s Finally, the incidental restriction on First Amendment free-
doms must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.29
B. Regulation of Adult Entertainment
Constitutional protection under the First Amendment is af-
forded to an activity that is considered to be expression. Extending
this protection to adult entertainment raises the interesting ques-
tion whether the entertainment is expressive conduct.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of First Amend-





29. Id. Symbolic speech was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 16.48, at 1106. The
O'Brien Court, however, articulated a working test to be applied to expressive conduct
cases. Id. § 16.49. Since its creation, the O'Brien test has been utilized in cases ranging from
the wearing of black armbands to flag desecration. Id. at 1108-12. See United States v. Eich-
man, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (flag desecration); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag
desecration); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands
to protest Vietnam war). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984) (sleeping in national park as form of demonstration). Prior to Barnes, decisions
involving adult entertainment and First Amendment claims have usually rested upon a
state's broad power to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment or the doctrine of
overbreadth. See infra text accompanying notes 30-77. However, in analyzing zoning restric-
tions affecting adult entertainment as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, the
Court has usually applied the O'Brien test or a similar three-part test. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 79 (1976); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 n.7 (1981). The
Court will uphold a time, place, and manner restriction under the three-part test "as long as
the restrictions 'are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication."' NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
3, § 16.47(a), at 1087 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), on remand, 705 F.2d
462 (7th Cir. 1983))).
There are factual distinctions between applying the O'Brien test to the destruction of a
draft card as a means of protesting and applying the test to nude dancing. There is no
indication that the nude dance at issue in Barnes is a means of protest. The Court has
previously noted, however, that although there may be substantial factual distinctions in
applying the test to a regulation affecting adult entertainment, "the essential weighing and
balancing of competing interests are the same." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 80 (1976).
[Vol. 9:201
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fornia v. LaRue,"o the Court upheld regulations prohibiting sexu-
ally explicit live entertainment on the ground that states are
granted broad latitude under the Twenty-first Amendment to reg-
ulate intoxicating liquors.3 ' The Court, in upholding the restric-
tion, considered several factors surrounding the enactment of the
regulations.32 Due to California's concern of an increase in sexually
explicit entertainment, public hearings were held to address the is-
sue.33 Evidence of testimony from those hearings 4 was presented,
which led the lower court to conclude that "[tihe story . . . was a
sordid one, primarily relating to sexual conduct between dancers
and customers . . . ."3 Further, it was discovered that prostitu-
tion, indecent exposure, rape, and assaults on officers occurred in
the vicinity of such licensed establishments. 36 The Supreme Court
reversed the district court's decision that the regulations abridged
freedom of expression, explaining that "[w]hile . . . some of the
performances . . . are within the limits of the constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that California
has not forbidden these performances across the board. '37 Further-
more, the Court found that the regulations were aimed at perform-
ances depicting "gross sexuality" rather than at forms of expres-
30. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
31. Id. at 118-19. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, captured six votes to
uphold the regulations. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, each filing sepa-
rate opinions.
32. Id. at 110-11. The Department of Alcoholic Beverages became concerned with the
type of adult live entertainment available in clubs and bars that it licensed. Prior to enact-
ment of the regulations, the department found that over the span of a few years topless
dancing progressed to bottomless dancing. Id.
33. Id.
34. Through the public hearings, the Department of Alcoholic Beverages learned that
in some establisments various sex acts were being conducted between the customers and
women entertainers. Specifically, "[c]ustomers were found engaging in oral copulation with
women entertainers [and] engag[ing] in public masturbation .... ." Id.
35. The district court held that the regulations abridged freedom of expression. La
Rue v. State of California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The district court noted that
the law was well settled that theatrical entertainment was constitutionally protected. Id. at
354. Further, it found that the California Supreme Court had found dancing and live theat-
rical performances to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. Id. According to the
district court, the state had to justify the regulations as either a prohibition of obscenity or
as a regulation directed at conduct under the O'Brien test. Id. at 354-55. The district court
determined that as a regulation of expressive "conduct," the regulations failed the O'Brien
test. Id. In particular, the governmental interest was directly related to the suppression of
expression. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 118. The Supreme Court noted that the performances were only prohibited
in establishments serving alcohol. Further, the Court recognized California's concern with
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sion with a communicative element.3 Justice Brennan, dissenting,
found the regulations applicable to some forms of protected speech
and disagreed that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized states
to use their liquor licensing power as a means to prohibit pro-
tected, even though undesirable, forms of speech."'
Subsequent to its decision in LaRue, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting topless dancing in
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.4" The Court emphasized that, although
LaRue had found some constitutional protection for nude dancing,
the State's interest in regulating alcohol under the Twenty-first
Amendment is superior to the minimal expression involved in nude
dancing.41 However, reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment was
unnecessary in Doran because the ordinance was held to be over-
broad.42 The ordinance prohibited appearing topless "in any public
place," not just in establishments licensed to serve alcohol.4"
Almost a decade after LaRue, the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the issue of adult entertainment as expression in the form
of nude dancing. In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,44 the
Court struck down as overbroad a zoning ordinance which prohib-
ited live entertainment, including nude dancing. 45 Because the or-
dinance effected a total ban on all live entertainment, it impermis-
sibly prohibited a "wide range of expression that has long been
held to be within the protections of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
46
The Schad majority noted that live entertainment falls within
the First Amendment guarantee.47 While nude dancing was not
38. Id.
39. Id. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, dissenting, considered the
regulations to be overbroad, thereby rendering them unconstitutional. Id. at 124-25 (Mar-
shall J., dissenting). "Although the State's broad power to regulate the distribution of liquor
and to enforce health and safety regulations is not to be doubted, that power may not be
exercised in a manner that broadly stifles First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 125.
40. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
41. Id at 932-33.
42. Id. The district court granted injunctive relief, noting that the ordinance was "on
its face violative of plaintiff's First Amendment rights in that it prohibits across the board
nonobscene conduct in the form of topless dancing .... " Id. at 925. The Court did not
disturb the district court's grant of injunctive relief agreeing that the ordinance appeared
overbroad. It did note, however, that the district court spoke in terms of an actual holding
at the injuctive stage but inferred that the district court intended only to refer to the lik-
lihood of success on the merits. Id. at 932-33.
43. Id.
44. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
45. Id. at 63-64.
46. Id. at 65.
47. Id. The Court defined entertainment to include "motion pictures, programs broad-
[Vol. 9:201
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enumerated as an example of the type of entertainment entitled to
protection, the Court recognized that "nude dancing is not without
its First Amendment protections from official regulation."48 Nudity
alone cannot place otherwise protected material outside the scope
of the First Amendment.4 Finding the ordinance overbroad in its
prohibition of all live entertainment, which included musicals,
plays, and concerts, °5 the Court did not address the extent to
which First Amendment protection encompasses nude dancing.
The dissent, on the other hand, found the ordinance permissible in
its prohibition against nude dancing, 51 effectively arguing against
the overbreadth doctrine itself. The dissent stated that even if
nude dancing were a form of expression, Mount Ephraim could
regulate it.
52
The Twenty-first Amendment was again utilized by the Su-
preme Court in New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,5 3 to
uphold a New York statute prohibiting nude dancing in establish-
ments licensed by the State to serve alcohol. The Court empha-
sized that the State's power to ban the sale of alcohol justified "the
lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless
dancing occurs.
54
Consistent with its decision in Bellanca, the Court upheld a
city ordinance prohibiting nude or nearly nude dancing in City of
Newport, Kentucky v. Iacobucci.55 Citing Bellanca and LaRue, the
majority considered the Twenty-first Amendment as granting
broad authority to a state or city to regulate alcohol through time,
place, or manner restrictions. 6 Thus, it was permissible to prohibit
cast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works
." Id.
48. Id at 66.
49. Id.
50. A zoning law must be narrowly drawn and serve a substantial government interest
for it to be held constitutional. Id. at 68. The majority noted that Mount Ephraim had not
fulfilled these requirements. Id. at 72-74.
51. Id. at 85.
52. Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, found the ordinance to be
a "minimal intrusion on genuine rights of expression . . . ." Id. at 86-87. Furthermore, the
dissent emphasized that people should be "masters of their own environment" within rea-
son. Id. at 85.
53. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
54. Id. at 715-17.
55. 479 U.S. 92 (1986).
56. 479 U.S. at 94-96. The Court reasoned:
"While the States, vested as they are with general police power, require no spe-
cific grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to
matters traditionally within the scope of the police power, the broad sweep of
the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more
19921
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nude dancing through state control over liquor licensing. 7 Further,
the Court noted that LaRue recognized that the State's interest in
regulating alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment "out-
weighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing . . .,.
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, stated that use of the Twenty-first Amendment in such a
manner was improper when the First Amendment is involved.5 9 In
remarking that the Twenty-first Amendment was originally meant
as an exception to the Commerce Clause, Justice Stevens accused
the Court of distorting the Amendment through recent decisions.6
Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that, under Schad, the Court
was required to determine whether the City had a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and whether that interest could be met in a less
restrictive manner on First Amendment expression.61 Instead, the
majority allowed the Twenty-first Amendment to take precedence
over the First Amendment, thereby upholding a regulation it
found to suppress constitutionally protected speech.2
The most recent Supreme Court decision addressing regula-
tion of adult entertainment is FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas.s3 In
that case, an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses 4
was designed to "eradicat[e] the secondary effects of crime and ur-
ban blight."6 5 The Supreme Court found that the licensing scheme
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare and morals."
Id. at 95 (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)). Thus, a state "has broad
power . . . to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under which liquor may be sold
.... " Id. at 96 (quoting New York State Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715 (1981)).
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 16.61(e), at 1152. Nowak and Rotunda suggest that
Bellanca should not be read to allow the Twenty-first Amendment to supercede the First
Amendment. They argue the Twenty-first Amendment merely allows the states greater free-
dom in which to regulate adult entertainment as expression through its power to regulate
intoxicating liquors. Id. at 1153.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U.S. 922, 932-33, (1975)).
59. Id. at 97. Justice Stevens disagreed with an interpretation which would allow the
Twenty-first Amendment to take precedence over the First Amendment. Id.
60. While noting that the strength of the Twenty-first Amendment had weakened with
respect to Commerce Clause cases, Justice Stevens remarked that the Court, inappropri-
ately, has carved out a role for the Twenty-first Amendment in First Amendment cases. Id.
at 98.
61. Id. at 99.
62. Id. at 98-99.
63. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
64. Id. at 602. The Dallas ordinance defined sexually oriented businesses as including
"an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult
motion picture theater, adult theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter
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created by the ordinance lacked the necessary procedural safe-
guards for protection of speech.6  Specifically, the ordinance did
not set time limits on inspections required for a license to be is-
sued to the sexually oriented businesses.6 " The Court noted that a
licensing scheme that allows indefinite postponement of the issu-
ance of a license "creates the possibility that constitutionally pro-
tected speech will be suppressed . *"6... 8 Justice White,6" concur-
ring and dissenting in part, noted that conduct encompassing both
speech and nonspeech elements can be regulated where the regula-
tion targets the nonspeech element and the infringement on the
speech element is incidental.7 0 Furthermore, Justice White found
the ordinance to regulate only those who managed the sexually ori-
ented businesses, not the content of what was sold.71 Justice Scalia,
who also found the ordinance constitutional, focused on the ability
to regulate the businesses as marketing obscene material.7 2 Al-
though Justice Scalia noted that certain materials sold may not be
obscene, 7  he emphasized that "a business devoted to the sale of
highly explicit sexual material can be found to be engaged in the
marketing of obscenity. . . . "7 Compliance with the First Amend-
ment was unnecessary because the community could prohibit busi-
nesses from marketing obscenity.75 Stated otherwise, Justice Scalia
66. The Supreme Court did not, however, decide whether the regulation was content-
neutral as a time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 603. In addition to the issue of the
ordinance effecting a prior restraint, the Supreme Court addressed three additional issues
regarding the Dallas ordinance: (1) the issue of standing regarding a civil disability provi-
sion; (2) the issue of sufficient government interest in applying the ordinance to motel room
rentals for time periods of less than ten hours; and (3) the issue of freedom of association.
Id. at 602.
67. Id. at 605. Nude dancing establishments were included as among the businesses
who challenged the ordinance. Id. at 602.
68. Id.
69. Justice White, concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dis-
agreed with what procedural safeguards were necessary. The majority held that in address-
ing the issue of prior restraint, only two of the three procedural safeguards identified in
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), were necessary. Id. at 606. Justice White, how-
ever, found Freedman inapplicable. Id. at 614.
70. Id. at 614. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(demonstrators not allowed to sleep in National Park in Washington, D.C.); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft card). See also supra note 29 and accompa-
nying text.
71. 110 S. Ct. at 615.
72. Id. at 617-25.
73. Id. at 620-21. Materials taken separately might not be considered obscene under
the test of obscenity established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Id.
74. Id. at 619.
75. Id. (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, (1966) as precedent giving
strength to Justice Scalia's theory). Justice Stevens noted that Ginzburg did not survive
1992]
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viewed the ordinance as regulating the "business of pandering. ''17
Viewed in this limited manner, Justice Scalia differentiated the
Dallas ordinance from the one in Schad which was held to be over-
broad in its prohibition of all live entertainment.1
7
III. BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE, INC.: THE NAKED TRUTH
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
Indiana's public indecency statute, as applied to nude dancing, did
not violate the First Amendment.78 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted prior Supreme Court decisions that suggested
that nude dancing is entitled to some form of First Amendment
protection. 9 In fact, the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit
that nude dancing is expressive conduct.80 However, the Court em-
phasized that this expressive conduct is "only marginally within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment .. ." As such, the
task was twofold. First, the Court had to ascertain the level of pro-
tection extended to nude dancing.8 2 Second, the Court had to de-
termine whether the statute in question impermissibly infringed
upon protected expression."
A. The O'Brien Test
The Barnes Court began its analysis by noting that the Indi-
ana statute did not prohibit nude dancing, but merely prohibited
public nudity. 4 Thus, the focus was permissible time, place, and
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
wherein First Amendment protection was held present in commercial speech. Id. at 617.
76. Id. at 622. In describing this method of viewing the ordinance, Justice Scalia noted
that highly explicit sexual material must be involved. Justice Scalia remarked that while a
nude pinup would not be considered highly explicit, a nude person performing live would
fall into this category. Id.
77. Id. at 623. "The Dallas ordinance ... targets only businesses engaged in unpro-
tected activity." Id.
78. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4745, 4747 (U.S. June 21, 1991).
79. Id. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance
prohibiting all live entertainment held unconstitutional); Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922
(1975) (injuctive relief granted against enforcement of ordinance prohibiting topless danc-
ing); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (regulations prohibiting various forms of adult
entertainment upheld through the state's broad power to regulate alcohol under the
Twenty-first Amendment).
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manner restrictions on expression.a5 Applying the O'Brien four-
part test, the Court held that "Indiana's public indecency statute
is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive ac-
tivity.""6 In other words, the Indiana statute met all four require-
ments of the O'Brien test. First, the statute was within the consti-
tutional power of the State.8 7 Second, it furthered a substantial
governmental interest, namely, societal order and morality.88
Third, the statute was directed at public nudity and not the ex-
pression involved in nude dancing. 9 Finally, the statute was nar-
rowly tailored because it required the dancers to wear a minimal
amount of clothing in order to comply with the statute."
Focusing primarily on the third prong of the O'Brien test, the
Court emphasized that the statute is not directed at preventing
nude dancing, nor is it directed at preventing whatever erotic mes-
sage that might be conveyed thereby;91 Indiana is merely trying to
prevent public nudity.92 The Court rejected the argument that be-
cause the statute is based on morality, the statute is aimed at the
expression of nudity. 3 Further, the Court asserted that although
many forms of conduct can be construed as expressive, the O'Brien
Court rejected expanding the category of "expressive conduct" in
such a manner.94
Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed with the
application of the O'Brien four-part test.9 5 Asserting that the Indi-
ana statute is a general law directed at conduct and not at expres-
sion, Justice Scalia stated that the First Amendment is not impli-
cated at all.9 6 Therefore, the intermediate level of scrutiny applied
by the Court was unnecessary and inappropriate. 7 According to




88. Id. Although Indiana does not record legislative history, the Court found no diffi-
culty in attributing public morality as the governmental interest sought through the statute.
Id. at 4747-48.
89. Id. at 4748. The Court surveyed the history of Indiana's public indecency statute
and found that it was enacted as a general prohibition against nudity. Id. at 4747.
90. Id. at 4748.
91. Id.
92. Id. "[I]t [is] not the dancing that [is] prohibited, but simply its being done in the
nude." Id.




97. Id. at 4750.
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regulation to be upheld.98
Focusing primarily on the purpose of the Indiana statute, Jus-
tice Scalia responded to the dissent's assertion that the purpose of
the statute is protection from offense. 9  He identified the purpose
of the statute as that community's effort "to enforce the tradi-
tional moral belief that people should not expose their private
parts indiscriminately. . . ."10 He further remarked that society
forbids particular activities because the activities are deemed im-
moral.1"' Thus, the statute is not aimed at any expression con-
veyed by nude dancing but is aimed at restricting nudity in order
to promote morality.
The concurrence by Justice Souter agreed with the use of the
O'Brien four-part test,1 2 but departed from the majority with re-
spect to its discussion of the second prong, namely, the substantial
governmental interest.1 3 Justice Souter noted that neither Indi-
ana's legislature nor its courts has indicated the actual interest to
be served through the statute, and asserted that it was unnecessary
to infer that the interest is only that of public morality. 104 Instead,
Justice Souter suggested that the Court consider the State's con-
tention that the Indiana statute's application to nude dancing was
for the purpose of preventing the secondary effects of nude danc-
ing establishments.0 5
B. The Dissent: The Statute Fails the O'Brien Test
While the majority, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter agreed
that the statute was directed at conduct and not at expression, the
dissent found the application of the statute clearly directed toward
suppressing the erotic message. 106 Justices White, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, dissenting, accused the Court of distorting and
ignoring settled doctrine in order to achieve its result.10
The dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that the
statute is the kind of general prohibition upheld in prior decisions
98. Id. at 4751.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
100. 59 U.S.L.W. at 4749.
101. Justice Scalia identified such forbidden activities as including prostitution, drug
use, and sodomy. Id.
102. Id. at 4751.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The secondary effects were identified as various criminal activity including
prostitution and sexual assault. Id.
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under the exercise of state police powers.'08 However, although the
cases cited by the majority were "true" general prohibitions, 109 the
dissent argued that the Indiana statute is not a general prohibition
because there is no suggestion that it can be applied to nudity oc-
curring anywhere."' Thus, because the statute is not a true general
prohibition, stricter scrutiny is required."'
According to the dissent, the Indiana statute fails the O'Brien
test. First, a governmental interest in "societal order and morality"
does not warrant suppression of "a significant amount of protected
expressive activity . *.".., Further, the statute -as applied is
aimed at expression and not conduct.' The dissent reasoned that
the purpose behind public indecency statutes is protection of non-
consenting parties from offense." 4 However, because the patrons of
nude dancing establishments are consenting adults, the state's pur-
pose must be suppression of "the harmful message" conveyed by
nude dancing. 1" 5 Finally, the statute is not narrowly tailored be-
cause it "[b]an[s] an entire category of expressive activity .... ,,6
The dissent suggested that if the state's real concern is the second-
ary effects associated with nude dancing establishments, it could
regulate nude dancing without affecting its expressive element.
1 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Barnes posed a problem for the Court in that it involved two
different establishments each providing nude entertainment but
only one establishment serving alcohol. Thus, the Court could not
rest its decision on the State's broad power to regulate alcohol
under the Twenty-first Amendment. Furthermore, the State of In-
diana had already saved the public indecency statute from being
108. Id. at 4753.
109. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and Bowers v. Harwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
110. Id. The dissent argued that in both O'Brien and Bowers the prohibitions on con-
duct applied everywhere, including conduct in the home. This argument is problematic in




113. Id. at 4755.
114. Id. at 4753.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 4754.
117. Id. The dissent argued that the State could restrict the hours of nude entertain-
ment or disperse nude establishments throughout an area. The dissent further argued the
Twenty-first Amendment was a means to regulate nude entertainment in establishments
licensed to serve alcohol. Id.
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declared overbroad. Unable to dispose of this case in the manner of
previous decisions involving adult entertainment and First Amend-
ment claims of expression, the Court applied the four-part O'Brien
test.
The difficulty in applying the O'Brien test in this case is that
Indiana has not articulated the purpose behind its public inde-
cency statute. Thus, because the governmental interest is un-
known, the Court and the dissent reach different results as to
whether the regulation is directed at expression.
The Court has consistently implied that nude dancing may be
protected expression under the First Amendment. Prior decisions
have indicated, however, that whatever the expressive element,
nude dancing is not beyond regulation. The Barnes decision does
hold that nude dancing is expressive conduct, but it fails to define
the level of protection afforded nude dancing. The only clear indi-
cation by the Barnes court is that nude dancing is expressive con-
duct barely protected by the First Amendment.
Kathleen T. Gibson*
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